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Abstract 
This dissertation Thesis was written as part of the Master of Laws (LL.M.) in 
Transnational and European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law 
at the International Hellenic University. 
 
Having regard to the complicated nature and structure of multinational corporate 
groups, and the inherent difficulties entailed when it comes to their insolvency, the 
present Thesis aspires to offer as comprehensive as possible within the limits of a 
dissertation an analysis of the new legal framework concerning cross-border 
insolvency of groups of companies, as introduced by the European Regulation 
2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (Recast). 
 
The new provisions establishing the mechanisms of coordination and cooperation, and 
amending the determination of the ‘Centre Of Main Interests’ (COMI), constitute the 
core of the research. The ultimate purpose of this venture is to address and discuss the 
effects, feasibility and utility of the innovative, but also ‘conservative’, new regulatory 
provisions in the context of efficient debt-restructuring procedures. In addition, the 
implications on the interests of creditors and the legal concerns with regard to the 
forum shopping phenomenon are also considered. 
 
Keywords: Insolvency, Groups of companies, Recast EIR, coordination, cooperation, 
COMI 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cross-border business activity constitutes a significant driving force on economic 
integration and market completion within the European Union, reflecting the 
continuing transnational expansion of trade and investment. Nevertheless, the 
insolvency of undertakings engaged in cross-border operations can inhibit the proper 
functioning of the internal market, especially when it comes to bigger structures, i.e. 
groups of companies, which operate in a larger area and to a higher volume. 
 
Proliferation of multinational company groups carrying out cross-border activities, in 
combination with the global financial crisis and the subsequent rapid growth of 
insolvencies, brought new challenges to insolvency proceedings, and increased the 
need for legal protection of businesses going insolvent and of the interests of their 
creditors. Indeed, those insolvencies entail practical difficulties as they regard not 
mere individuals but various complex structures of corporate groups operating with 
multiple levels of companies on a transnational level and thus, they concern many 
areas of law and various different national legal systems that often claim international 
jurisdiction for the same debtor. 
 
The need for harmonised rules at EU level with regard to cross-border insolvencies of 
groups of companies in the light of the strong presence of multinational corporate 
groups was acknowledged by the European legislators who recast the European legal 
regime by adopting the European Regulation 2015/848 on Insolvency Proceedings 
(Recast), as successor of the European Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 (in the 
following, EIR).  
The Recast Regulation made a significant leap towards the effective administration of 
insolvency proceedings of corporate groups and the establishment of legal certainty in 
the market economy by promoting cooperation and coordination of the relevant 
proceedings without deeming the group members as a single entity, but retaining their 
separate legal personality, as envisaged in insolvency law. In addition, having regard to 
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the increasing number of companies which have experienced failure of businesses 
after the economic crisis, it adopted a restructuring approach as a key objective by 
giving the debtor a ‘second chance’, while protecting creditors’ interests. 
 
In light of the above, the present Thesis aims to provide a thorough analysis of the new 
European legal framework as shaped under the Recast EIR, by closely examining the 
feasibility and efficiency of its provisions concerning the management of cross-border 
insolvencies of multinational corporate groups, taking into due consideration its main 
aims; combat of forum shopping and preservation of viable commercial business. 
 
Accordingly, this Thesis will start by presenting in Chapter I the evolution of European 
Insolvency Law by setting the historical framework leading to the adoption of the 
Recast Regulation. The following step will entail the analysis of the main objectives and 
features of the Recast EIR, which reflect the gaps of the previous legal framework, and 
thus, justify the need for the introduction of the new Regulation. 
 
In order to better understand the rationale for the establishment of the relevant 
framework on corporate group insolvencies, in Chapter II the Thesis will proceed with 
the presentation of the problematic situation of the insolvency of more than one 
companies belonging to the same corporate group. It will then continue with providing 
a definition and interpretation of the concept and legal status of the multinational 
groups of companies. An analysis of the re-shaped and clarified concept of the Centre 
of their main interests, as the connecting factor to determine international jurisdiction 
in cross-border insolvencies, will follow. 
 
Further on, Chapter III will be dedicated to the provisions of the Recast EIR regarding 
the new mechanisms for the administration of the insolvency of groups of companies, 
namely the cooperation and coordination of the relevant proceedings. In particular, a 
detailed analysis of the cooperation and communication obligation as well as of the 
insolvency practitioners involved will be provided.  
The coordination procedure will be also analysed. Accordingly, the procedure of 
opening of the group coordination proceedings and the ‘opt-out and opt-in 
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mechanisms’ will be illustrated, while a determination and description of the role, 
tasks and powers of the coordinator will also be provided along with the presentation 
of the coordination plan. 
 
The last chapter (IV) will be structured around a critical examination of the innovative 
but at the same time, as we will see, conservative provisions concerning the insolvency 
of corporate groups. Special focus will be put on the approach chosen by the EIR to 
establish mere coordination and avoid consolidation of the proceedings, the voluntary 
nature of the newly introduced mechanisms, and the potential abusive forum 
shopping situations, with implications on the interests of creditors.  
 
In light of these issues, that are currently under examination by legal practitioners and 
academics, the main question arises as to whether the new cooperation and 
coordination procedures are designed properly, constitute a suitable and effective 
mechanism for the treatment of insolvencies of group members in the pursuit of the 
objectives set by the EU, and are in line with the ‘rescue-friendly’ culture. In this 
direction, a comparison between the two mechanisms is deemed to be useful. 
Accordingly, implications on the contribution of the Recast EIR to the enhancement of 
legal certainty, its practical efficiency and utility, and its response to the expectations, 
will constitute the backbone of this research. 
 
As far as the methodological aspects of the research are concerned, it must be firstly 
pointed out that the innovative nature of the Recast Regulation entailed difficulties in 
the research process. Indeed, the Regulation was recently introduced and 
incorporated into the national legislations, and thus, has not brought new case law and 
practical examples to the surface which could offer guidance in determining the 
feasibility of the new provisions. 
Hence, a theoretical approach is adopted, involving a comparison and contrast of a 
wide variety of sources, including the examination of the relevant literature, the study 
of the relevant legislative sources, and the approaches already developed by the Court 
of Justice case-law. 
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CHAPTER I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
 
1. Historical Background: The path towards the adoption of the Recast 
European Insolvency Regulation  
 
Within the internal market of the EU, founded on the principles of free movement, 
security and justice, internationalisation and harmonisation have been stimulated by 
eliminating obstacles to the functioning of the market, but also by actively promoting 
its development. Although the completion of the internal market was a goal already 
set in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome in terms of the common market1, harmonisation in 
the field of European insolvency legislation had been rather fruitless for decades. This 
notwithstanding the fact that the absence of harmonized rules on insolvency 
proceedings was viewed as a lack in the legal protection of persons and businesses, 
and thus the insolvency of undertakings was conceived as affecting the proper 
functioning of the internal market2.  
 
The EU’s interest in insolvency matters is long-standing, with the initiative dating back 
to 1968 when the Brussels Convention was adopted towards harmonisation in the ﬁeld 
of jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgements. However, the 
European legislator deemed that insolvency law should be dealt with separately, 
through a separate legislative tool, due to inherent particularities of the cross-border 
insolvencies, and therefore insolvencies were excluded from the scope of the 
legislative texts3. In the meanwhile, the allocation of international jurisdiction in cross-
                                                 
1
 Jean Noël and Jacques Lemontey, Report on the Convention Relating to Bankruptcies - Composition and 
Analogous Procedures’ (1970) 16.775/XIV/70-E (EU Commission Working Document), p. 8:“The intention 
of the Member States of the European Economic Community is to establish between themselves a 
genuine and vast internal market conforming to the rules of free competition. Everything must therefore 
be done not only to eliminate obstacles to the functioning of this market, but also promote its 
development.” 
2
 Ibid pp. 3, 8-9, 11. 
3
 Article 1(2) of the (Brussels) Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [1968] OJ 1972, L 299/32. See also Noël, Lemontey (n 1) p. 1, where it is stated that 
the 1970 Draft Bankruptcy Convention “supplements” the Brussels Convention, thus confirming both 
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border insolvencies was left to the regulatory scope of the national rules of private 
international laws, and the recognition of court judgements was highly dependent on 
the discretion of national courts, based on the ‘territorialism’ approach4. 
 
The need for harmonisation in the area of European insolvency law became more 
urgent when the cross-border activities started increasing in the 1980s, leading up to 
the 1987 Draft Liquidation Directive5, the Draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention6, and to 
the subsequent 1990 ‘Istanbul Convention on Certain Aspects of Bankruptcy’ with 
narrower scope7 - all eventually abandoned before ratification. 
 
The long and conflicted effort on the creation of harmonised insolvency rules was 
intensified and led up to the 1995 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings8, which was 
eventually not timely ratified9. Gradually, the idea of a Convention was abandoned and 
the adoption of a Regulation was deemed more suitable10. The 1995 Convention, 
                                                                                                                                               
the non-applicability of the latter on insolvency/bankruptcy matters, and the effort of the EC legislators 
to create a separate legislative tool dealing with these issues. 
4
 The ‘territorialism’ approach is discussed further in Sub-chapter 2. 
5
 Draft Proposal for a Liquidation Directive [1987] DOC XV/43/87. Eventually it was not further 
developed and adopted as the national legal systems presented similarity on liquidation matters and 
thus, it was not considered essential. 
6
 Draft Bankruptcy Convention, [1970], Commission Document No. 3.327/1/XIV, Bulletin of the European 
Communities on the Draft Convention and the Report, Supplement 2/82. It was composed in 1970, 
amended in 1980 and finally published in 1982 as the ‘1980 Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, 
Arrangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings’, together with an explanatory Report, known as 
the ‘Report Lemontey’ (n 1), although without eventually being adopted. 
7
 European Convention on Certain Aspects of Bankruptcy of the Council of Europe, [1990] Istanbul, 
5.VI.1990 (European Treaty Series, No. 136). In contrast to the 1980 Convention on Bankruptcy, 
Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings, the Istanbul Convention dealt only 
with liquidation proceedings and the recognition of liquidating acts only under certain circumstances. 
8
 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 November 1995, Council Document CONV/INSOL/X1, 
reproduced in OJ L. See Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Report of the on the Convention 
on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 November 1995, [23 April 1999] (PE 228.795/fin); European Parliament, 
Resolution on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 November 1995, [1999] OJ 279, 
01/10/1999 P. 0499. 
9
 It failed to acquire the necessary political consensus, as it was not ratified by the UK in the designated 
time due to political controversies. The delay lies on the refusal of the United Kingdom to sign it in time 
in protest against the European Commission’s deny to lift the embargo on British beef and cattle 
imposed during the mad cow disease threat, as well as on the distorted relations between the UK and 
Spain regarding the sovereignty over the territory of Gibraltar. See also Wessels Bob, ‘The European 
Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast): The First Commentaries’, (2016) European 
Company Law, vol. 13, no. 4, p.6. 
10
 See Resolution of the European Parliament on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 
November 1995, (n 8), calling the Commission “…to put forward a proposal for a directive or a regulation 
on bankruptcies involving companies which operate in several Member States…”. 
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though, to a large extent, was considered to be the main influence of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law11 and it constituted the basis of a new proposal12 which developed it into 
the EC Regulation 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings13. 
 
The Regulation 2000, based on ex Articles 65 and 67 of the EC Treaty (Article 81 TFEU), 
entered into force in 2002 with general force on all Member-States14, regulating intra-
Community cross-border insolvency procedures. It constituted a revolutionary step, as 
it abandoned the negative term of ‘bankruptcy’. Besides, it set forth a recognisable 
legal framework for cross-border insolvency proceedings within the EU with the 
objective to maintain legal certainty and protect creditors’ rights.   
 
The underlying rationale for the original Regulation was extensively analysed in the 
Virgós/Schmidt Report15 and reflected the need for harmonisation of conflict-of-law 
rules16 and the combat of forum shopping situations in cross-border insolvency within 
the EU17. Its most important contribution was the provision of rules to determine the 
proper jurisdiction for the opening of insolvency proceedings18 by inserting the 
concept of ‘Centre of Main Interests’ as the connecting factor19. The Regulation 2000 
                                                 
11
 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1997) UN, GA Res 52/158, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 52nd sess, Agenda Item 148, UN Doc 
A/RES/52/158 (30 January 1998). The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency was “designed 
to assist States to equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonized and fair framework”, as stated 
in its incorporated Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law, I (1).  
12
 The new proposal, based on the initiative of Germany and Finland, contained an amended version of 
the 1995 Convention and developed the latter into the Regulation 1346/2000. For the similarities 
between the 1995 Convention and the EIR 2000, See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee no. 
C75/01 of 2000, para. 1.1.   
13
 Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1. 
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulation 2000’, ‘original Regulation’ or ‘EIR 2000’.. The Regulation 2000,  
arising out of the failed negotiations for a Bankruptcy Convention, was issued in 2000 and came into 
force on May 31, 2002 in all Member States. According its Recital (8), it constitutes a Community Law 
measure and as such it shall be binding and directly applicable in all Member States, except Denmark 
that opted out. 
14
 According its Recital (8), it constitutes a Community Law measure and as such it shall be binding and 
directly applicable in all Member States, except Denmark that opted out. 
15
 Miguel Virgós, Etienne Schmidt, Report on the Convention of the Insolvency Proceedings (1996) 
[6500/96]. 
16
 Council Regulation 1346/2000, Recital 23. 
17
 Ibid Recital 4. 
18
 Ibid Articles 1-15. 
19
 Ibid Recital 13. Hereinafter ‘Centre of Main Interests’ will be also referred to as ‘COMI’. 
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also established rules for the applicable law20, the recognition of these proceedings21, 
cooperation between the relevant jurisdictions22, and the role of the liquidator23.  
 
Additionally, the Regulation adopted a combined method, the so-called ‘modified 
universalism’24, being in principle within the sphere of ‘universalism’ approach25 by 
introducing main insolvency proceedings26 with universal effect and centralised 
administration upon all debtor’s assets and creditors. At the same time it permitted 
parallel secondary proceedings which cover only the portion of assets located in the 
specific jurisdiction27, thus retaining elements of the principle of ‘territoriality’28, 
necessary to protect specific local interests.  
 
However, despite its noble intentions, the Regulation 2000 did not resolve all the 
crucial issues29. On the contrary, it was intended as a short term political compromise, 
                                                 
20
 Council Regulation 1346/2000, Articles 4 and 28. 
21
 Ibid Articles 16-26. 
22
 Ibid Articles 39 - 42. 
23
 Ibid Article 18. 
24
 Other authors use the term “controlled universality” in order to refer to the modification of 
universalism by the principle of territoriality. See in particular Alexander J. Belohlavek, ‘Centre of main 
Interests (COMI) and jurisdiction of national courts in insolvency matters (insolvency status)’ (2008) 
International Journal of Law and Management, Vol 50, No.2, at 54; Reinhard Bork and Renato Mangano, 
European Cross-Border Insolvency Law (2016) Oxford University Press p. 230. 
25
 According to Recital (11) of the Regulation 2000, due to the significant disparities existing in EU 
substantive laws, the adoption of a pure universalist approach would not be practical due to the 
difficulties in the efficient management of insolvencies having cross-border effects. The universal model 
envisages the existence of a single bankruptcy (insolvency) forum which, in the course of unified 
proceedings, would apply a single bankruptcy law of universal scope, and would include the totality of 
the debtor’s worldwide assets in one insolvency proceeding. See also Irit Mevorach, ‘Cross-border 
insolvency of enterprise groups: The choice of law challenge’ (2014) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, 
Financial & Commercial Law, vol. 9, p. 108; Neil Hannan, Cross-Border Insolvency: The Enactment and 
Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2017) Springer, p.2. 
26
 Council Regulation 1346/2000, Article 3 (1). 
27
 Ibid Articles 3 (2) and 34-38. 
28
 According to the default and traditional rule of national sovereignty, reflecting the insolvency 
framework prior to the adoption of the Regulation 2000, transnational bankruptcies were governed by 
the principle of territoriality, meaning that every Member State had exclusive jurisdiction over the 
portion of the insolvent debtor’s assets and creditors located within their territory. Hence, under the so-
called ‘territorialism’ approach, insolvency proceedings often involved multiple fora and several 
bankruptcy laws, applying simultaneously upon a single debtor, thus, creating problems in cases of 
multinational corporations. See Hannan (n 25) p.3. 
29
 During the period of the studies for the 10-year anniversary and the conduct of a report for the 
effectiveness of the Regulation 2000, 13 of the 26 participating Member States considered that overall, 
the original Regulation was efﬁcient and effective, two Member States were unsure, and 11 considered 
that it was not. See Samantha Bewick, ‘The EU Insolvency Regulation, Revisited’ (Winter 2015) 
International Insolvency Review, Vol. 24, p. 173. 
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which was supposed to be reviewed ten years after its operation in order to determine 
its feasibility considering its internal deficiencies deriving from its restraint scope and 
the ‘liquidation’ approach30, as well as the serious reservations expressed during the 
approval process31. Besides, it was reflecting different needs and interests responding 
to a different historical and economic context. More specifically, it was oriented to 
address the issues of a world which was different commercially, technologically and 
legally, before the increase of cross border activity and complex structures of 
corporate groups involved in mega bankruptcies; at a time when insolvency 
proceedings were mainly oriented, in most legal systems, to simple liquidations, not 
restructuring32.  
Especially, the notion of the COMI was left vague leaving room for abusive relocation 
and forum shopping33, while no special provisions for groups of companies were 
included34, making cross-border insolvency proceedings problematic for such 
companies in the EU35. Moreover, it lacked an effective mechanism for transparency 
and creditor participation. 
 
Under the need of effective harmonization of procedural insolvency law, in 2012 the 
European Commission submitted proposals for the amendment of the Regulation 
200036. Following extensive tripartite discussions between European Commission, 
European Parliament and Council37, the Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency 
                                                 
30
 Under the original Regulation the sole purpose of insolvency proceedings was liquidation, as its scope 
extended only to collective insolvency proceedings entailing the divestment of the debtor. See Recital 
(10) and Article 1(1) of the Regulation 2000. 
31
 Alan J. Stomel, ‘Answering the Call of the European Court of Justice in Eurofoods’ (2011) Institute for 
European Studies, Working Paper 3/2011, p. 16, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/60836/1/2011.3.pdf 
(accessed 20 December 2017). 
32
 Ibid p. 11. 
33
 Council Regulation 1346/2000, Recital 13. 
34
 Philipp Esser, ‘European Update Reform of the EU Regulation: New Framework for Insolvent Company 
Groups: Part 1’ (March 2015) American Bankruptcy Institute, 34-3 ABIJ 38, p. 2. 
35
 Michael Weiss, ‘Bridge over Troubled Water: The Revised Insolvency Regulation’ (2015) International 
Insolvency Review, vol. 24, p. 192. 
36
 After 10 years, the Regulation 2000 was due for a revision and the European Commission proceeded 
to an impact assessment: European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Executive 
Summary of the Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Revision of Regulation (EC) No 
1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings (12 December 2012) SWD/2012/0417.  
37
 The European Commission originally proposed an amendment to the existing Regulation, but the 
changes proposed by the Council proved too complicated to implement through an amendment format, 
which led to the adoption of a recast version of the Regulation 2000 in a form of a new Regulation. 
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proceedings was adopted on 26 June 2015, with direct effect on Member States 
applying to insolvency proceedings opened after 26 June 201738.  
The EIR is an update and an enhancement of EU rules on cross-border 
insolvency procedures, as a successor of the Regulation 2000, and as part of the 2020 
EU Strategy on economic growth39, constituting the new legally binding instrument, 
directly applicable to all Member States40, regulating insolvency proceedings of cases 
where the debtor has assets or creditors in more than one Member States. 
 
 
2. Scope and objective of the Recast Insolvency Regulation 
 
The Recast Regulation does not entirely alter the insolvency landscape, but it re-
shapes it by expanding and clarifying some provisions of the Regulation 2000, while 
introducing a number of substantially innovative rules.  
 
Its importance lies especially in the fact that its provisions are more in line with the 
current market’s needs and priorities of national insolvency laws. In concrete terms, it 
enhances legal certainty and reorganization by shifting away from the traditional 
‘liquidation’ approach to an ‘economic rescue approach’, which is now prevailing in 
national insolvency reforms41. It embraces and promotes a rescue-friendly culture 
towards a restructuring approach by giving the debtor a ‘second chance’, without 
disfavouring creditors’ claim42. This approach is reflected in the adoption of a neutral 
                                                 
38
 Regulation 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 of the European Parliament and of the Council on insolvency 
proceedings (recast), OJ 2015 L 141/19. Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Recast Regulation’, ‘Recast EIR’ 
or merely ‘Regulation or ‘EIR’. The new Regulation the will be subject to a full review after 10 years of 
applicability (i.e. 2027) and then every 5years after that. The application of the group coordination 
sections will be reviewed after 5years (2022), and proposals for amendments may be considered then. 
39
 See Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final; Commission Impact Assessment (n 36) para. 1 
40
 Denmark opted-out again. 
41
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Recital 10. See also Maria-Thomais Epeoglou, ‘The Recast European 
Insolvency Regulation: A missed opportunity for restructuring business in Europe’ (2017) UCL Journal of 
Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 6, No 1, p.32. 
42
 Ruprecht Karls Universität Heidelberg and Universität Wien, External Evaluation of Regulation No. 
1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (2011) (JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4), p. 10. Hereinafter also 
referred to as ‘The Heidelberg-Vienna Report’; See also Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher and Stuart Isaacs, The 
EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceeding. A Commentary and Annotated Guide (2009) Oxford University 
Press (2
nd
 edn) pp. 266 - 267. 
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vocabulary which limits references to liquidation; for instance, secondary proceedings 
are no longer conceived merely as ‘liquidating proceedings’ while the term ‘liquidator’ 
is replaced by ‘insolvency practitioner’43. 
 
A number of changes are intended to contribute to the overall objective of the 
Regulation, in particular: enhanced cooperation between proceedings opened in 
several Member States44, mechanisms to minimise the need to open secondary 
proceedings45, the establishment of national insolvency registers to promote 
transparency and publicity of the proceedings46, and the new framework for the 
management and administration of multiple insolvency proceedings relating to a group 
of companies, with the aim to achieve coordinated proceedings and thus, more 
possibilities for group rescue47.  
 
Another, more traditional key objective of the recast EIR is to prevent fraudulent or 
abusive forum shopping48, by establishing the lex concursus as the conflict rule49, 
though with a number of exceptions50. Further developments include greater legal 
certainty regarding the method of determination of the business’s ‘centre of main 
interests’ in order to prevent malpractices and abusive forum-shopping in respect with 
the rules on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law.  
  
                                                 
43
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 2(5), wherein the relevant definition of insolvency practitioner is 
provided, in contrast to Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000, Article 2 (b). Hereinafter insolvency 
practitioners are also referred to as “IPs” in brief. 
44
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Recitals 48-50, Articles 41-43. 
45
 This is achieved by enabling any decision to postpone or refuse the opening of secondary proceedings 
to be challenged by local creditors. See Recitals 23-24, 41-43, 45, 48 – 50 of the Recast Regulation. 
46
 The national insolvency registers are supposed to be interconnected via the e-Justice portal. See 
Article 24 of the Recast Regulation. The establishment of national insolvency registers will not come into 
force until 26 June 2018, with the requirement for an EU interconnected register by 26 June 2019..  
47
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Recitals 42-44. The need to establish such rules was acknowledged in the 
‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee on the application of the Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
insolvency proceedings’, 12.12.2012 COM (2012) 743 final, p. 14. 
48
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Recital 5.  
49
 Ibid Recital 66: “The law applicable to both main and territorial insolvency proceedings and their 
effects shall be, unless otherwise stated in the Regulation, the law of the Member State in which such 
proceedings have been opened”.  
50
 To ensure legal certainty of transactions in States other than where the proceedings have been 
opened, the Regulation provides for exceptions from the main principle of lex concursus, addressed in 
Articles 8-18. 
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In addition, the decision of the Court of Justice51 in Gourdain52, later confirmed in 
DekoMarty53, has now been codified54, thus providing courts that have international 
jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings, also with jurisdiction for actions or 
disputes deriving directly from the insolvency proceedings, such as avoidance actions. 
An important improvement in line with the ‘second-chance approach’ constitutes the 
wider, ratione materie, scope of the Recast EIR, applying more categories of insolvency 
proceedings55 as it is not limited to purely established insolvency, but covers 
‘hybrid/debtor-in-possession’ proceedings, ‘pre-insolvency restructuring’ proceedings, 
and proceedings granting debt-relief or debt adjustment56. Thus, the Regulation 
becomes applicable to collective judicial or administrative proceedings, including 
interim proceedings57. 
 
It must be further noted that also the EIR, like its predecessor, opted for the ‘modified 
universalism’. Moreover, it provides for rules to be used to determine which 
substantive provisions of insolvency law would govern proceedings58, thus avoiding 
harmonising substantive insolvency law. Such harmonisation would require the 
harmonisation of some or all aspects of other laws relating to the provision of lending 
and credit, especially corporate law, trust law, and property law. Therefore, it 
preserved (and expanded) the exceptions laid down in the original Regulation, 
according to which, all matters arising within the insolvency were to be dealt with 
under the law applicable in the Member State in which the main proceedings were 
opened59.  
 
                                                 
51
 Formerly European Court of Justice (ECJ), since 2009 renamed to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). 
52
 Case C-133/78, Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler [1979] ECR 1979, para. 4. 
53
 Case C-339/07, Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] I-00767, para. 21. 
54
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 6. 
55
 Ibid Recital 10. 
56
 Ibid Article 1(1); See also Gerard McCormack, ‘Something Old, Something New: Recasting the 
European Insolvency Regulation’ (1 March 2016) Modern Law Review, vol. 79, issue 2, pp. 121–146. 
57
 Ibid Recital 15. These proceedings are based on a law relating to insolvency and in which, for the 
purpose of avoidance of liquidation, adjustment of debt, reorganisation or liquidation, the debtor is 
totally or partially divested of his assets; instead, an insolvency representative is appointed, or the 
assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court. 
58
 Bewick (n 29), p. 173. 
59
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 7.  
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CHAPTER II. CROSSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY OF MEMBERS OF GROUPS OF 
COMPANIES 
 
For a proper analysis and understanding of the new framework on cross-border 
insolvency of groups of companies, it is vital to provide some background information 
relating to the context of the term ‘group of companies’, and the inherent difficulties 
especially when it comes to the insolvency of members of company groups belonging 
to different Member States. In addition, it is necessary to investigate the approach 
adopted by the new Regulation to reduce the abusive forum shopping phenomenon by 
resolving jurisdiction problems in such insolvency proceedings arising from the ‘cross-
border’ element and the complex structure of the groups of companies.   
 
The new provisions are directed towards the efficient administration and management 
of insolvency proceedings involving different members of a group of companies, in 
accordance with the main objective of the Regulation to achieve the rescue of the 
corporate group as a whole and facilitate its debt recovery60. 
 
 
1. Determination of the concept and legal status of ‘groups of 
companies’ 
 
Despite the lack of a common definition in the literature, it has been generally 
accepted that the notion of ‘group companies’61 - also referred to as an ‘enterprise or 
corporate group’- includes a set of legally autonomous companies which operate 
business under common entrepreneurial or financial control62 and pursue common 
                                                 
60
 European Commission, press Release, ‘New rules facilitating cross-border insolvency proceedings 
enters into force today’ (Brussels, 26 June 2017) available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-1743_en.htm (accessed 13 October 2017). 
61
 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘GoCs’. 
62
 See Nathaniel Leff’s definition quoted in Asli M. Colpan and Takashi Hikino, ‘Foundations of business 
groups: Towards an integrated framework’, in AM Colpan, T Hikino, JR Lincoln, The Oxford Handbook of 
business groups (2010) Oxford University Press; Asli M. Colpan and Takashi Hikino, ‘Introduction: 
Business Groups Re-examined’, in Asli M. Colpan and Takashi Hikino (eds) Business Groups in the West: 
Origins, Evolution and Resilience (2018) Oxford University Press, p. 18.  
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purposes63. This term covers different forms of economic organisations that come in 
various sizes, different legal and operational structures, and different degrees of 
complexity and integration64, thus requiring special legislative treatment that could 
properly accommodate the diverse types65. This kind of structure may operate across 
multiple jurisdictions through the ownership or control of a bundle of linked 
undertakings in multiple jurisdictions, thus constituting ‘multinational enterprise 
group’66, subject to diverse national laws67. 
 
The Recast Regulation fills the gap of its predecessor and provides for a concrete 
definition for the GoCs, by determining them as a number of companies consisting of 
parent and subsidiary companies68, in the sense that the latter is being controlled 
(directly or indirectly) by the first, and each undertaking (both parent and subsidiaries) 
is a ‘member’ of the group69. An undertaking that prepares consolidated financial 
statements in accordance with the EU Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU) is deemed to 
be a parent undertaking70. With this new definition referring only to parent and 
                                                 
63
 Gavin Nicholson, Geoffrey Kiel and Jennifer Ann Tunny, ‘Board Evaluations: Contemporary thinking 
and Practice’ in Thomas Clarge and Douglas Branson, The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance 
(2012) SAGE Publ. Ltd. 
64
 In contrast to the notion of ‘group of companies’, the term of a ‘single company’ refers to enterprises 
operating per se, without incorporating separate legal entitles; See Irit Mevorach, Insolvency within 
Multinationa  Enterprise Groups (2009) Oxford University Press, p. 10; Peter Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprise and the Law (2007) Oxford University Press (2nd edn) p. 6. 
65
 Reinhard Bork and Renato Mangano, ‘European Insolvency Law, Text and Cases (2012) Wolters Kluwer 
Deutchland, p. 340; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, (UNCITRAL) Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law, Part three: Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, (2012) UN, para. 2; 
Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups (n 64) p. 1; Irit  Mevorach, ‘Cross-border 
insolvency of enterprise groups: The choice of law challenge’ (2014) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, 
Financial & Commercial Law, vol. 9, p. 10. 
66
 See Mevorach, ‘Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups’ (n 64) p. 10; Peter Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprise and the Law (2007) Oxford University Press (2nd edn), p. 6; Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directives 78/660/ EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 182 of 29 June 2013. 
67
 Sandeep Gopalan and Michael Guihot, ‘Cross-border Insolvency Law and Multinational Enterprise 
Groups: Judicial Innovation as an International Solution’ (April 15, 2016) George Washington 
International Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, Deakin Law School Research Paper No. 16-15, p. 549. 
68
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 2 Para. 13. 
69
 Similar is the definition provided by the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law Part Three (n 
65), p. 15; Bob Wessels, ‘The EU Regulation on Insolvency proceedings (Recast); The first commentaries’ 
(April 2016) European Company Law, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 129-135. 
70
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 2 Para. 14. This may allow for a broader (mis)interpretation 
considering the broad, ratione materie, scope of Article 22 (7) of the EU Accounting Directive (n 66), 
which states that Member States may require undertakings, which are managed on a unified basis or 
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subsidiary companies, the Recast Regulation limits the applicability of the provisions of 
Articles 56-77 concerning groups of companies to the ‘vertically integrated groups’, 
excluding ‘horizontally integrated groups’ groups that are made up by companies on 
the same level71. 
 
Corporate groups constitute the most commonly encountered business structure – 
preferred usually for strategic reasons or due to the benefits of managing the risks by 
limiting the group’s liabilities for subsidiaries’ debts72. The latter derives from the 
doctrine of separate legal personality73, meaning that each member belonging to a 
group maintains its distinct legal personality and is subject to its own jurisdiction74, 
separately from its managers and shareholders. The separability principle constitutes 
the main approach that the new Regulation supports - in line with the Eurofood case 
findings of the CJEU-, and it aims at providing legal certainty in business, in the sense 
that the rights and obligations of all parties involved need to be clear, predictable and 
stable75.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the maintenance of separate legal identities within an enterprise 
group, its components, function and management are often interlinked76, while 
dominant influence especially of the parent company over the subsidiary is usually 
apparent77. This is mainly the form of ‘equity-based’ multinational enterprises, 
                                                                                                                                               
have a common administrative, managerial or supervisory body, to draw up consolidated financial 
statements. See Max Planck Institute, ‘The Implementation of the New Insolvency Regulation: 
Recommendations and Guidelines’ (2013) JUST/2013/JCIV/AG/4679, p. 109. 
71
 Christoph Thole and Manuel Dueñas, ‘Some Observations on the New Group Coordination Procedure 
of the Reformed European Insolvency Regulation’ (2015) International Insolvency Review, Vol. 24, Issue 
3, pp. 221-222. 
72
 Irit Mevorach, ‘Appropriate treatment of corporate groups in insolvency: a universal view’ (2007) 
European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 8, issue 2, p. 180; UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law, Part three (n 65) pp. 5-6. 
73
 The separate legal personality doctrine was established in the English case Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
Ltd. [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30). 
74
 Case C-341/04 (2006), Eurofood IFSC Ltd. ECR 2006 I-3813, para. 30. 
75
 Gopalan and Guihot (n 67), p. 449.  
76
 Colpan and Hikino, ‘Foundations of business groups: Towards an integrated framework’, p.17; Olivia 
Johanna Erdélyi, Twin Peaks for Europe: State-of-the-Art Financial Supervisory Consolidation: Rethinking 
the Group Support Regime under Solvency II (2015) Springer, pp. 79-80; Carlo Altomonte and Armando 
Rungi, ‘Business Groups as Hierarchies of Firms, Determinants of Vertical Integration and Performance’ 
(2013) European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No 1554/June 2013, p.10. 
77
Ruprecht Karls Universität Heidelberg and Universität Wien, External Evaluation of Regulation No. 
1346/2000/EC on Insolvency Proceedings (2011) (JUST/2011/JCIV/PR/0049/A4), p. 221. 
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meaning a corporate group having ownership structure78, with the typical example of 
an integrated business being carried out by a company group, where the member 
companies have divided certain tasks between themselves79. The other basic type of 
the corporate groups is the ‘contractual-based’ form which entails contractual (looser) 
links between companies80, involving joint ventures and special control rights81. 
 
 
2. An outline of the problem 
 
A problem arises when a multinational corporation, partly or wholly, goes into 
insolvency82, as the process is more complicated, expensive and uncertain, in 
comparison to insolvency of individual entities. Indeed, the assets and creditors of 
multinational corporate groups are dispersed across different jurisdictions83, and, 
consequently, and it is difficult to determine the applicable insolvency law84. Also, the 
related entities have separate legal status, with a separate body of shareholders, 
diverse creditors, and (usually) separate assets85. Besides, insolvency of a related 
corporate entity usually means that the whole group is facing financial difficulties, and 
thus, the fact that insolvency has historically been conducted on an individual legal 
                                                 
78
 Irit Mevorach, ‘The “Home Country” of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency’ (2008) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 57, issue 2, p. 429. 
79
 The simplest and most commonly encountered example is the one of a parent company producing 
goods, while subsidiaries located in different Member States are distributing these goods. See e.g. Rover 
case, High Court of Justice Birmingham [30.3.2006] NZI 2006, p.416, annotated by Mankowski. 
80
 Such structures can be achieved in various ways, for instance via the establishment of distribution 
franchise alliances, or by licensing production rights as part of a production franchise package. See 
Mevorach, ‘The “Home Country” of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency’, pp. 429-430. 
81
 Robert van Galen, ‘The Recast Insolvency Regulation and Groups of Companies’, in Rebecca Parry and 
Paul Omar (eds.), (2016) Reimagining Rescue, INSOL Europe, p. 54. 
82
 The term ‘Insolvency’ derives from the term ‘insolvent’. An individual/company becomes insolvent 
when it can no longer meet its financial obligations with its lender(s) and debts become due. Thus, 
insolvency is the state of inability to pay the debts or where the outstanding liabilities of the company 
exceed the assets’ measurable value. Insolvency is often referred to as ‘bankruptcy’, although the latter 
is currently being avoided as the ‘rescue-company’ approach is preferred. See Ian Fletcher, ‘Insolvency 
Law in Private International Law (2005) Oxford University Press (2
nd
 edn), pp. 1-4. 
83
 Lucian Bebchuk and Andrew Guzman, ‘An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies’ (1999) 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 42, p. 775. 
84
 Jona Israel, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation a Study of Regulation 1346/2000 on 
insolvency Proceedings in the Light of a Paradigm of Co-operation and a Comitas Europaea (2005) 
Intersentia, p. 30.; Gopalan and Guihot (n 67) p. 556. 
85
 Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, ‘Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A 
Proposal’ (2012) American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Vol. 86, p. 8. 
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entity basis, without treating corporate groups as a whole86 may increase the 
possibility of a domino effect within the group. 
 
In addition, as soon as insolvency proceedings are opened against a company member 
of the group, the existing organizational and managerial framework of the corporation 
seizes to function and the business is undertaken by the liquidator. Thus, insolvency 
law reduces significantly the influence of the management in the company. Usually the 
liquidator has to follow the separate national insolvency law rules which might be 
detrimental to the functioning of the business as a whole and might not serve the 
interests of all member companies, especially when not all of them necessarily need to 
become insolvent87. Such scenarios constitute an obvious impediment to the effective 
liquidation or successful restructuring of the business as a whole, especially in 
transnational cases. 
 
It must be taken into account also the fact that groups of companies come in all shapes 
and sizes88, even with different shareholders involved in different levels of the group of 
companies to achieve economic or geographical advantages89. Problems are, though, 
created when it comes to structures more complicated than that of a fully integrated 
business in the form of the ‘parent-subsidiary’, e.g. when involving intermediary 
companies, sometimes not operative but constituting mere investment vehicles 
serving economic or administrative purposes.  
 
Such complex situations require a special treatment which not all the national 
insolvency laws had developed until the adoption of the new Regulation, and at least 
not with a similar approach. This disparity (or often absence) of rules treating GoCs90 
                                                 
86
 Samantha Bewick, The EU Insolvency Regulation, Revisited’ (Winter 2015) International Insolvency 
Review, Vol. 24, issue 3, p. 185. 
87
 In this context, a scenario would be, for example, when the parent company wants to stay in the 
market of the subsidiary, but the liquidator must shut down the latter, following its obligations under 
insolvency law, or when only the parent or an intermediary company becomes insolvent, or when the 
whole group needs to become insolvent but without a coordinated proceeding it might be harmful for 
the interests of creditors, the employees etc. 
88
 The ‘Heidelberg-Vienna Report’ (n 77), p. 222. 
89
 Brenda Hannigan, Company Law (2016) Oxford University Press (4
th
 edn), p. 18.  
90
 The ‘Heidelberg-Vienna Report’ (n 77), p. 225. The significant detrimental omission of the original EIR 
not to take into account the status as a member of a group of companies was the result of the absence 
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and the separate legal personality doctrine, along with practical problems and the fear 
for potential damage to creditors, employers and shareholders91, prevented legislators 
from reaching a consensus and follow a comprehensive approach to provide for a 
coherent set of rules dealing with insolvency of group of companies per se. However, 
the absence of such rules generated an expanding body of case law92, along with the 
market practice, with special focus on the highly disputable issue of how to ascertain 
the so called ‘Centre of main interests’ in the case of cross-border group insolvencies93.  
 
 
3. Specifying the concept of COMI of the groups of companies 
 
In both the Recast and the original Regulation international jurisdiction for the opening 
of insolvency proceedings is linked to “the focal point of the debtor’s core activity”94. 
This refers to the location with which the debtor has a real connection, as addressed in 
Article 3(1) Recast EIR with the English term ‘centre of main interests’95, the concept of 
which, as the ‘connecting factor’ establishing a Member State’s international 
jurisdiction, has an autonomous meaning and is to be interpreted uniformly, 
independently of national rules of the Member States96. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
of a political compromise and of any generally accepted national solution which could serve as an 
appropriate model for European legislation, especially when considering the fact that the national legal 
regimes either had not enacted provisions dealing with group companies issues and particularly the 
group insolvency, or had developed an approach to the matter in diverse modes; See 
also Mevorach, ‘Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups’ (n 64), p. 1. 
91
 European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on 
insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)).  
92
 Case law was developed on both national (national courts) and supranational level (Court of Justice). 
93
 E.g. Eurofood case (n 74); Kaus Pannen, European Insolvency Regulation (2007) De Gruyter 
Commentaries on Insolvency law, De GruyterRecht (1
st
 edn), p. 104. 
94
 Reinhard Bork, ‘The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency: EU and UNCITRAL Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2017) International Insolvency Review, vol. 26, 
issue 3, p. 255. 
95
 This term had been already used with identical wording in Article 4(1) of the Istanbul Convention of 
the European Council of 1990. The Regulation 1346/2000 in Recital 13 states that the ‘centre of main 
interests’ “should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his or her 
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties”; According to its Article 3 
paragraph 1 of Regulation EC 1346/2000 this is presumed to be the location of the company’s registered 
ofﬁce. 
96
 Eurofood case (n 74), para. 31. 
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Having regard to the ambiguity of the notion of the COMI under the Regulation 2000 
resulting often to abusive forum shopping, the Recast EIR attempted to waive the legal 
uncertainty created, by ratifying and codifying the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice97, as well as by taking into due account the Virgós/Schmidt Report98.  
 
The recast EIR left unchanged the basic concept of a debtor’s COMI; however, a 
revised and more precise deﬁnition in alignment with the CJEU case law has now been 
provided, this time in Article 3, which constitutes a substantive provision and, thus, has 
a binding legal concept99. Accordingly, the new definition stipulates a presumption that 
a company’s COMI is to be found at the registered office, namely in the place of 
incorporation100. Anyhow, the presumption of the current registered office101 does not 
apply in case of relocations of the registered office within a period of 3 months prior to 
the opening of proceedings102. In this way, the Regulation establishes a ‘look-back’-
namely a ‘suspect’- period on the application of the registered office presumption103. 
In such an occasion, the presumption will continue to apply for the place of the former 
registered office.  
                                                 
97
 Recital (30) of the Recast Regulation is a literal transcription of CJEU’S ruling in the Case C-396/09 
Interedil Srl v Fallimento Interedil Srl & Intesa Gestione Crediti SpA [2011] I-09915, para 59; See also 
Gerald McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 
The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 68, issue 1, p. 169. 
98
 Miguel Virgós, Etienne Schmidt, Report on the Convention of the Insolvency Proceedings (1996) 
[6500/96], para. 75: “The concept of "centre of main interests" must be interpreted as the place where 
the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable 
by third parties” which was transposed into recital (13) of the EIR 2000. The Report offered for the first 
time a concrete explanation of the COMI, recognized as the “main interpretative tool’ of the current 
COMI concept and therefore, was directly transposed into the recitals of the EIR. 
99
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 3(1). The definition of the COMI is now a substantive provision in 
the Recast Regulation and not merely a concept in the preamble like in the original Regulation (Recital 
13), thus, finally it has a binding legal concept. 
100
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 3 (1) and its sub-paragraph 2. For individuals exercising an 
independent business or professional activity, the COMI is presumed to be the “place of principal 
business”, and for other individuals the COMI is presumed to be the “place of habitual residence” 
(Article 3 (1) sub-paragraphs 3 and 4).  
101
 Referring to the principal business or habitual residence, respectively. 
102
 Regulation 2015/848, Article 3(1)(4). This also applies to independent business owners, with the only 
difference that COMI is to be identiﬁed in accordance with the state in which the head ofﬁce is located 
(Article 3(1)(5)–(6) of the Recast EIR). For natural persons, the presumption applies to their state of 
residence, and relocations during the 6 months prior to insolvency are disregarded (Article 3(1)(7)–(8)) 
EIR.  
103
 Peter Mankowski, ‘The European World of Insolvency Tourism: Renewed, But Still Brave’ (2017) 
Netherlands International Insolvency Review, vol. 64, no. 1, p. 100. 
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It must be pointed out that adopting the registered office presumption, the Regulation 
seems to be in line with the incorporation theory which states that the company is 
subject to the law of the country where it has been incorporated104. 
 
However, the Recast EIR seems to follow also the imperative of the ‘real seat’ theory105 
by deeming the central administration, and thus the actual seat of the business as a 
factor able to rebut the registered office presumption. More specifically, it stipulates 
that the presumption of the registered office is rebuttable if a comprehensive 
assessment of all the relevant factors establishes, in a manner that is “ascertainable by 
third parties”106, that the company’s actual centre of management and supervision is 
located on a regular basis in another Member State107; id est if the genuine activities of 
the company are being pursued in the territory of another Member State108. Thus, for 
the proper determination of jurisdiction in the context of insolvency, the Recast EIR 
establishes the so-called ‘COMI criteria’ or ‘COMI-test’, proposed in the Eurofood case 
                                                 
104
 Within national laws there are two controversial theories to determine which national (company) law 
is applicable to a particular company, i.e. the incorporation theory and the real seat theory. According to 
the first one, adopted in common law jurisdictions including the UK, Switzerland, Ireland, Denmark and 
Netherlands, the company is subject to the law of the country where its registered office is located, thus 
in which it has been incorporated. According to the real seat theory, developed in France and applying 
in most civil law jurisdictions of continental Europe, the crucial point is the place where the company 
has its ‘real seat’ and actual administrative seat. This theory is more consistent with what is commonly 
referred to as the 'objective proper law' test: those in charge of the company's management are not 
free to choose the law which governs company law relationships. Thus, the ‘real seat’ doctrine often 
constitutes an obstacle to forum shopping abuses but is also accused of frustrating cross-border 
company mobility in Europe. For a brief overview and the relevant case law with regard to the two 
theories, see Jorge Miguel Ribeiro, ‘Free Movement of Companies within the EU – The Never-Ending 
Saga’ (17 February 2014), available at: https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=645#_ftn2 
(accessed 31 January 2018); Jorge Miguel Ribeiro, ‘Tensions between European Union Law and Private 
International Law – impact on cross-border mobility of companies’ (24 April 2017), available at: 
 https://officialblogofunio.com/2017/04/24/tensions-between-european-union-law-and-private-
international-law-impact-on-cross-border-mobility-of-companies/#_edn3 (accessed 31 January 2018). 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Recital 28 of the Recast Regulation explicitly states that third parties should refer especially to 
creditors and their perception as to the actual COMI of the debtor, while providing also that this may 
require adequate and ‘in due course’ notification of creditors regarding potential shifts in COMI. Thus 
Recital 28 incorporates the doctrine of ISA Daisytek case {Re Daisytek – ISA Ltd and others [2003] All ER 
(D) 312 (Jul)} that interprets ‘third parties’ as referring manly to creditors, and of the Interedil case (n 
97), according to which certain publicity requirements ought to be met. In this sense, ‘ascertainable’ 
does not mean that the creditors must have actual knowledge of all the relevant facts, but at least to 
obtain the basic information. For example, Recital 28 of the Regulation states that “…in the event of a 
COMI-shift, it may be required to inform the creditors of which the debtor is carrying out its activities (…), 
for example by drawing attention to the change of address in commercial correspondence, or by making 
the new location public through other appropriate means”.  
107
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Article 3 (1), subparagraph 1 sentence 2. 
108
 Ibid Recital 30.  
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as “a test in which the attributes of transparency and objective ascertainability are 
dominant”109. 
 
The adoption of a combination of the two contrasting approaches developed for the 
cross-border mobility of companies and the conflicts of laws rules, seems reasonable 
and oriented to achieve a twofold result: on the one hand, with a more ‘head office’ 
oriented approach based on the Regulation attempts to preserve freedom of 
establishment and a debtor’s flexibility to restructure and relocate COMI. On the other 
hand, especially the non-application time limits and the possibility to rebut the 
presumptions are intended to work as safeguards against fraudulent forum 
shopping110 and the so-called ‘bankruptcy tourism’111, in accordance with the explicit 
mandate in Recital 29 of the recast EIR112. The rationale of the latter lies under the 
general objective of insolvency law to provide enhance legal certainty, in the sense 
that “potential creditors must be able to ascertain in advance the legal system which 
would resolve any insolvency affecting their interests”113. 
 
It must be noted that the role that courts play in determining COMI has been clarified 
to provide for a minimum control by the competent court114, by being obliged to 
proactively examine the actual perception of creditors as to where the business is 
administered, following the COMI criteria115. Accordingly, the court seised of a request 
to open proceedings will rule on jurisdiction of its own motion, and specify in the 
judgment on which ground it retained jurisdiction116.  
 
                                                 
109
 Opinion of AG Jacobs the Eurofood case (n 74), para. 118. 
110
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Recital 31; Bork, ‘The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: EU and UNCITRAL Cross-Border Insolvency’ (n 94) p. 256. 
111
 ‘Bankruptcy tourism’ refers to the phenomenon whereby debtors choose or favour one jurisdiction 
over another (usually by relocating and re-establishing their ‘centre of main interests’) and attempt to 
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Regarding especially the uncertainties pertaining to insolvency cases of GoCs, for 
which case law offered conﬂicting deﬁnitions of COMI, the Recast EIR does not 
attempt to raise them by establishing a new method for identifying the COMI, but 
instead it does so by enhancing the clarity of the notion of the COMI in general. 
 
The Regulation rejects the initial solution adopted by the English courts in the 
Daisytek117 and Crisscross Telecommunications Group118 cases (followed by Italian 
Courts in the Cirio Del Monte case119), which tended to be in favour of a single COMI as 
they considered group companies to be a single economic unit allowing for a whole 
group to be deemed to have its centre of main interest in one place120. This approach 
feemed the principal management and control of the group to lay within the territory 
of that one place121, thus applying exclusively the ‘mind of management’ imperative122. 
This solution was perceived to favour abusive COMI-relocations123 and to be relevant 
only in a limited number of multinational groups where the management and activities 
of the group are centralized124.  
 
Instead, the idea put forward by the EU legislators, reflected in the Recast EIR125, 
maintained the approach of the CJEU in the findings of the cases of Eurofood126, 
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Interedil127 and Rastelli Davide128 that favoured the individual legal personality of each 
group member and promoted the idea that the COMI of each group member should 
be examined separately and independently from the COMI of the parent company. For 
example, the mere fact that a subsidiary conducts its administration within the 
territory of its registered office, but its economic choices are controlled by a parent 
company in another state is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of Article 3 EIR, as 
this fact normally lacks the attributes of transparency and objective ascertainably129.  
 
Consequently, the EIR refrains from creating a real ‘group COMI’ (single forum) 
approach which deems the group operating as a single economic unit. This seems 
reasonable considering that the opposite approach could be detrimental to legal 
certainty and perhaps to the interests of foreign creditors of other member groups. 
Besides, the variety and complexity of group structures makes it difficult to provide 
clear criteria for the ‘connecting factor’ in the recast EIR for whether a single 
(exclusive) forum is justified or not, considering that not all the companies of the same 
group have identical management, especially when the group companies are loosely 
connected and there may be intermediate shareholding members on different 
levels130. 
 
Under this consideration it should be stressed that the fact that the new Regulation 
does not provide for a single COMI in group insolvencies does not necessarily mean 
that this cannot be a possibility. On the contrary, the COMI of several or even all 
subsidiaries can be deemed to be the COMI of the parent company, if this is proven to 
be the case131, after the judge applies the ‘COMI test’.  
Besides, the recast EIR already explicitly allows for a certain degree of a group COMI 
approach; in case the individual COMI of several companies belonging to the same 
group is found to be in a single member state, the court is not limited and may open 
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insolvency proceedings for them all132. This is important for cases where the 
management of the group companies is interlinked and the supervision and the 
management of the interests of the subsidiaries is located in the Member State where 
the parent company resides133.  
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CHAPTER III.  THE NEW PROVISIONS ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS OF 
GROUPS OF COMPANIES UNDER THE RECAST EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY 
REGULATION 
 
The new elaborated provisions in the recast EIR on group insolvency proceedings, 
inspired from the UNCITRAL Model Law and the rulings of the Eurofood case, came to 
fill in the gap related to the management of multiple cross-border insolvencies of 
group of companies by introducing the whole new chapter V, as expanded in Articles 
56-77134. Having regard to the particularities of the corporate groups, the increase of 
multinational enterprises and the need for uniformity in the field, the new regulatory 
framework foresees procedural rules for cooperation between the actors involved and 
lays down a new voluntary process for opening “group coordination proceedings”135. 
 
The underlying rationale for this is that the insolvency of a group of companies should 
be administered efﬁciently136, with proper cooperation in order to strike a balance with 
the protection of creditors’ interests and to effectively encourage the rescue of the 
group as a whole137, while retaining the doctrine of separate legal personality138 and the 
entity-by-entity approach expressed in Eurofood’s dictum. 
 
The cross-border element in the scope of application of these provisions is obvious as 
the rules apply only to the extent that insolvency proceedings relating to different 
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members of the same group of companies have been opened in more than one 
Member States139.  
 
 
1. Cooperation and Communication in group insolvency 
 
1.1. General obligations to communicate and cooperate 
 
The recast Regulation establishes a set of general obligations of communication and 
cooperation of all actors involved in insolvency proceedings which have been opened 
in different Member States in relation to at least two members of a group of 
companies140. Such cooperation shall have the objective to naturally facilitate the 
effective administration of the proceedings, to the extent that it is compatible with lex 
concursus141 and does not entail any conflict of interests. 
 
The obligation for cooperation must be accomplished by any appropriate means, such 
as through the conclusion of an agreement or a protocol, for which no specific format 
is required; Recital 49 states that they can take any form, written or oral, may cover 
any scope, whether generic or specific, and may be concluded between different 
parties, for example between insolvency proceedings or between courts142. The costs 
of the cooperation and communication shall be regarded as costs and expenses in the 
respective proceedings143.  
 
This obligatory cooperation laid down in the new Regulation constitutes itself a 
novelty, considering the inadequate (up until then) regulatory regime of the original 
Regulation which provided for cooperation only between liquidators involved in main 
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and secondary proceedings and only in relation to the insolvency of a single 
company144.  
 
The Recast EIR, clearly influenced by the UNCITRAL Guidelines145, encourages 
cooperation between the appointed insolvency practitioners, meaning the authorised 
persons defined in Article 2(5), by means of protocols and tasks allocation 
agreements146. Cooperation entails the communication of any relevant information to 
each other, with the objective of supervising the relevant affairs of the group, 
examining the possibility of coordinating the insolvency proceedings and cooperating 
in the elaboration of a rescue plan where appropriate147. 
 
By recital 52, cooperation between insolvency practitioners should be “aimed at 
finding a solution that leverage synergies across the group”, but must not “run counter 
to interests of any of the creditors in each of the proceedings”. At this context, any 
confidential information exchanged in the context of communication should be 
appropriately protected148. Moreover, the allocation of tasks between the IPs is 
encouraged, as well as the grant of additional powers.  
 
The Regulation introduces a similar obligation of cooperation and communication for 
courts that have opened proceedings for several members of the same group, acting 
beyond their national borders149 and aiming at the better coordination of the 
proceedings and the communication of relevant information. In particular this 
cooperation can be implemented by any means the courts consider appropriate, such 
the coordination of the appointment of the insolvency practitioner, the administration 
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of the assets, the conduct of the hearings, and the approval of any necessary 
protocols150. It must be noted that judicial cooperation is based on the principles of 
sincere cooperation and mutual trust; principles that within the European Union are 
based on Article 4(3) of the TEU, Articles 67(1) (4), 81(2)(a) (c) of the TFEU. 
 
In the same vein, the Regulation provides for cooperation and communication 
between IPs appointed in insolvency proceedings of a member of the group and the 
court before which a request for insolvency proceedings is pending or which has 
already opened such proceedings. Such cooperation covers the request of the IP for 
information concerning the insolvency proceedings of other members of the group, as 
well as the request for assistance concerning the proceedings151. 
 
It must be pointed out that during the revision process of the Regulation 2000, it was 
suggested that cooperation – coordination in group insolvencies should draw upon the 
model of main and secondary proceedings. The similarity of the mechanisms and the 
intention of the EU legislator are reflected in Recital 52 which explicitly refers to a 
“similar obligation to cooperate and communicate”152. The general obligations 
introduced in Articles 56-59 are indeed similar to those for main and secondary 
proceedings in Articles 41-43. The main difference is that the first ones apply in cases 
of different debtors being part of the same group of companies, while the second ones 
apply in case where for the same debtor more than one court in different Member 
States has jurisdiction153. 
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1.2. Powers of the insolvency practitioners against other members of the 
group 
 
In light of the cooperation obligation, a number of extra powers relating to the 
proceedings of other members of a group of companies are granted to the insolvency 
practitioners with the objective to facilitate the effective administration of the 
proceedings.  
In particular, for companies which are not participating in group coordination 
proceedings154 , the Regulation also provides for alternative mechanisms to achieve a 
coordinated restructuring of the group155, which take shape in the powers given to the 
appointed insolvency practitioners156. 
 
Such powers include the right to be heard in any of the proceedings opened in respect 
of any other member of the group, to attend creditors’ meetings, and to propose a 
reorganisation plan in a way which would enable the relevant creditors’ committee or 
court to consider it.  
 
However, the most striking power conferred entails that in cases where a coordinated 
restructuring plan has been proposed under Article 56 (2) (c), and it presents 
reasonable chances of success, each IP is entitled to request a stay of any measure 
related to the realization of the assets in the proceedings opened with respect to any 
other member of the same group. The stay of measures may last up to three months, 
with a possibility of extension to up to 6 months, provided that the plan “would be to 
the benefit of the creditors in the proceedings for which the stay is requested” and 
such a stay is necessary to ensure the proper implementation of the plan157. Such a 
stay can only be requested under the condition that neither the insolvency 
proceedings for which the requesting IP has been appointed, nor the insolvency 
proceedings in respect of which the stay is requested have been included in group 
coordination proceedings. It seems as though a coordinated restructuring plan under 
                                                 
154
 As group coordination is provided in Article 61 of the Recast Regulation.  
155
 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, Recital 60.  
156
 Ibid Article 60. 
157
 Ibid Article 60 (1) (b) (iiii). 
   
  -29- 
Articles 56 (2) (c) is an alternative to the group coordination proceedings (Article 61-
72), and they cannot be pursued in parallel158. 
 
The court that has opened the insolvency proceedings, for which a stay is requested, 
shall grant the request for a stay in whole or in part, if it is satisfied that the conditions 
outlined above are fulfilled159. It may further require the requesting IP to take 
appropriate measures to guarantee the interests of the creditors in the proceedings. 
Considering the wording of Article 60(2) strictly referring to the conditions laid down in 
Article 60(1)(b)160, it seems as though the list of those conditions is exhaustive and the 
court is not allowed to scrutinize others. It is unclear though whether the court must 
examine the satisfaction of the conditions only as for their formalities or it can actually 
review them, and in particular the volatile term of “appropriateness”161.  
 
 
2. Coordination of group insolvency proceedings 
 
2.1. The opening of group coordination proceedings 
 
The most signiﬁcant change in the Recast Regulation constituting a central piece for a 
successful restructuring of insolvent groups of companies162 (or at least for higher 
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revenue163) is the introduction of group coordination by means of a specific voluntary 
procedure164.  
 
According to the newly introduced system of coordination, a request for coordinating 
the insolvency proceedings of more than one member of the group may be filed 
before any competent court having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a 
group member by the insolvency practitioner appointed there165. 
Such a request shall be made in accordance with the law applicable to the insolvency 
proceedings in which the requesting insolvency practitioner has been appointed166, 
and must be accompanied by (a) a proposal and justification for the person nominated 
as a “coordinator”, (b) an outline of the proposed group coordination, (c) a list of all 
insolvency practitioners appointed over the members of the group, courts and 
competent authorities involved, and (d) an outline of the estimated costs and their 
distribution among the different estate167. 
 
In cases of parallel requests168, the priority rule of Article 62 applies, granting the court 
first seized exclusive jurisdiction over the coordinated insolvency proceedings169. The 
objective of the priority principle is to avoid forum shopping situations where the 
involved parties seek for the most convenient jurisdiction170. However, this principle 
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may be overridden when the court ﬁrst seised seems less appropriate; the jurisdiction 
can be transferred to another eligible court with a majority vote of two-thirds of all 
insolvency practitioners appointed in insolvency proceedings of the members of the 
group171. Such a ‘choice of court’ agreement remains possible up until the decision of 
opening group coordination proceedings172. 
 
Before opening group coordination proceedings, the court needs to make a 
preliminary assessment and be satisfied that (a) such proceedings are appropriate to 
facilitate the effective administration of the different proceedings, (b) no creditor of 
any group member is likely to be financially disadvantaged by the inclusion in such 
proceedings and (c) the proposed coordinator meets the requirements as laid by Art. 
71173. If the result of this assessment is positive, the court shall inform the insolvency 
practitioners and offer them an opportunity to be heard174. 
 
Under Article 70, and in accordance with the non-obligatory nature of the group 
coordination, the IPs maintain the discretion to consider the recommendations made 
by the coordinator and the content of the group coordination plan, while they conduct 
the insolvency proceedings. Albeit they are not obliged to follow them in part or in 
whole, a ‘comply-or-explain’ mechanism is established if they decide against following 
it, meaning that the IPs should still give reasons to the group coordinator and, if 
applicable, to the competent body under the applicable lex fori concursus. 
 
 
2.2. Opt-out and opt-in mechanisms 
 
The IPs of group members are granted the possibility to object wholly or partly to the 
coordination proceedings within 30 days of receipt of notice of the opening of the 
coordination proceedings175, using a non-mandatory standard form176. The decision to 
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open group coordination proceedings must not be made before this objection period 
has elapsed177. In this way the IPs are given adequate – but not unlimited- time to raise 
their objections, while at the same time the provision guarantees that at the time of 
the decision of opening group coordination proceedings the court knows which group 
members would be included. The latter is important for the court to decide whether 
the conditions for opening are fulfilled, as in case too many group members have 
opted out and/or the ones which have opted out were of vital importance to the 
success of the group coordination proceedings, it may be concluded that group 
coordination proceedings would not be appropriate to facilitate the effective 
administration of the insolvency proceedings. 
 
The right to object is limited exclusively to the IPs and the debtor-in-possession178, 
excluding creditors, other courts or public authorities involved. The only (implied) 
exception is the IP who filed the request to open group coordination proceedings as it 
would be rather paradoxical if he were allowed to object to his own request179.  
 
The objection may concern either the inclusion of the company in the coordination 
proceedings or just the person proposed as a coordinator180. In the latter caser, the 
court has the discretion to refrain from appointing that specific person as a 
coordinator of the proceedings and at the same time invite the IP who objected to 
submit a new request in accordance with Article 61(3). In case of an objection to the 
inclusion of their company in the coordination proceedings, the proceedings in respect 
of which the IP has been appointed will be not included in the coordination 
proceedings and this member shall bare no costs related to the coordination181.  It 
must be noted that Article 64 EIR does not explicitly require a justification for the opt-
out. Moreover, the IP, prior to making the decision on whether or not to participate in 
the proceedings, is subject to the approval requirements set under national law182. 
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Such an objection will result automatically in that member’s exclusion (‘opt-out’) from 
the group proceedings, which will have no effects against the excluded member183, 
relieving it also from bearing the costs of the proceedings. Nevertheless, the opt-out 
does not stop the opening of group coordination proceedings for the other members 
of the group. The latter may be achieved indirectly, though, in case the objecting IP 
gives convincing reasons for the opt-out that either all others will also opt-out or that 
the court will come to the conclusion that the conditions for the opening of group 
coordination proceedings184EIR are not fulfilled185. 
 
Nevertheless, the decision to be excluded from group proceedings is not final, as 
Article 69 Recast EIR establishes the possibility of a subsequent “opt-in”186, as a 
counterpart to the opt-out right, the admissibility of which will be decided by the 
coordinator. The latter may accede to it under certain conditions187 which intend to 
protect from any repercussions a subsequent opt-in may have for the entire 
coordination, namely under the condition that at that specific time the request is 
consistent and appropriate for the facilitation of the insolvency proceedings relating to 
the different group members, and that no creditor of the other group members is 
likely to be financially disadvantaged thereof. Alternatively, the request may be 
admitted if all the IPs consent, subject to their national law188.  
 
If the coordinator validly agrees to the request and there is no successful challenge189, 
the group member participates ex nunc from the time the coordinator’s decision 
becomes effective190. It is in question, though, whether there is a possibility for a 
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subsequent opt-out at this stage. Probably an opt-out possibility would be consistent 
with the voluntary nature of the group coordination proceedings – albeit an 
agreement by all insolvency practitioners might be required. On the other hand, 
though, given that the Regulation explicitly deals with a subsequent opt in but leaves 
open the question of subsequent opt out, it could be argued that an opt out is not 
possible. 
 
Although neither formal requirements nor an obligation state the reasons to submit 
the opt-in request are required, for evidentiary purposes a textual written would 
certainly be advisable, containing a statement of reasons, since the admissibility of the 
request depends on persuading the coordinator or all the other IPs191. Moreover, 
despite the absence of a specific time limit, it is obvious that the later the request is 
filed, the smaller its chances for success will most likely be192, taking into account the 
stage that the group coordination proceedings have reached and the practical 
feasibility to include another group member. 
 
 
2.3. The coordinator and the coordination plan 
 
According to Article 71 (2), the coordination proceedings are to be administered by the 
insolvency practitioner, to be identified as the coordinator. Only a qualified insolvency 
practitioner – except for those appointed for the group members193 - may be eligible 
to be a coordinator194. The coordinator must be impartial, act with due care195 and 
have no conflict of interest in relation to the respective group members, their creditors 
and the insolvency practitioners concerned.  
 
The main task assigned to the coordinator is to propose a “group coordination plan”, 
containing agreements between the IPs on various issues, recommendations for the 
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coordinated conduct of the insolvency proceedings196, settlement of intragroup 
disputes where the coordinator is appointed to function as a mediator, and a 
comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated approach to resolve 
corporate insolvencies and re-establish the ﬁnancial soundness of the group197. The 
group coordination plan establishes procedural coordination explicitly excluding any 
‘consolidation of the insolvency estates”198. 
 
All this occurs on a voluntary basis without any legal binding effect199, but in case the 
IPs refuse to follow the coordination plan they must provide justification to the 
competent national bodies and to the coordinator200. Although the Regulation leaves 
the consequences open, it may be assumed that non-compliance with the coordination 
plan -in accordance with its voluntary nature - constitutes an opt-out. However, it is 
not clear how this could work from a procedural point of view and whether a court 
decision or a decision by the coordinator would be required, or just a communication 
of this refusal and its justification to the aforementioned authorities would suffice. 
Another possible consideration would be an amendment to the coordination plan or 
the recommendations until an accepted solution is found; albeit this may entail delay 
or result in a dead end.   
 
In addition to the proposal of a coordination plan, the group coordinator is granted 
quite extensive rights and duties attributed to the position of a general administrator, 
namely to participate and be heard and informed201, e.g. in creditors’ meetings, to 
resolve intra-group disputes and request information from IPs. The coordinator shall 
be also given the opportunity to persuade the companies and creditors to adhere to a 
restructuring approach. The coordinator may even lodge a request to the court having 
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opened the respective proceedings for a stay for a period up to six months of the 
proceedings if he deems it beneﬁcial202.  
In order to achieve a better result in coordinating the proceedings, Article 74 provides 
for the obligation of the appointed IPs to cooperate with the coordinator under the 
condition that such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to the 
respective proceedings and to communicate any relevant information.  
 
Regarding the remuneration of the coordinator, this must be proportionate to the 
tasks fulfilled and reflect reasonable expenses203. Moreover, in case a significant 
increase of 10% of the estimated costs204 is considered to be required for the 
fulfilment of their tasks, the coordinator has the obligation to inform the IPs and seek 
prior approval of the court opening group coordination proceedings205 This is in line 
with the Recital 58 of the Regulation that stresses that the advantages of group 
coordination proceedings should not be outweighed by the costs of those proceedings. 
Thus, the costs must be sustainable and in balance with the purpose of the 
coordination.  
 
Lastly, it must be noted that the appointment of the group coordinator is not 
irrevocable. Indeed, Article 75 provides for the revocation of their appointment by the 
court on its own motion or at the request of an IP of a participating group member in 
case the coordinator acts to the detriment of the creditors or fails to comply with the 
tasks and obligations as assigned under the Regulation. 
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CHAPTER IV. CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE RECAST REGULATION 
PROVISIONS ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY OF GROUPS OF 
COMPANIES 
 
Although an explicit legal framework is finally set to deal with cross-border insolvency 
of groups of companies, by providing a more concrete regime for jurisdictional matters 
with the amendment of the COMI, and by establishing cooperation between the actors 
involved and coordination of the relevant proceedings, its effectiveness is doubtful and 
subject to criticism. Therefore, a further analysis is required, with special focus on the 
‘soft’ nature of the two mechanisms deriving from their limitation to mere procedural 
issues, the similarities between the two mechanisms, as well as on the legal 
uncertainty caused from the voluntary, non-binding, regime. In addition, specific 
considerations on the forum shopping phenomenon and on potential implications of 
the provisions on the interests of creditors are to be set out. 
 
 
1. The approach chosen by the Recast Regulation 
 
The approach taken by the Recast EIR was to respect the separate legal personality of 
the members belonging to the same group of companies by retaining the strict “entity-
by-entity” principle206, and therefore it adopts a soft approach based on mere 
procedural cooperation/coordination207, rejecting any kind of consolidation208. Hence, 
it preserves the principle, that, although administered in a coordinated manner, each 
of the group members, including its assets and liabilities, remain separate and distinct. 
In this way, the integrity and identity of individual group members as well as the 
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substantive rights of claimants remain unaffected209. This mere ‘procedural 
coordination’ approach is intended to promote procedural convenience and cost-
efficiency by facilitating the obtaining and exchange of comprehensive information on 
the business operations of the group members involved, and by assisting in the 
valuation of assets, in the identification of creditors and other parties in interest, and 
in avoiding duplication of effort210. 
 
Accordingly, the coordination and cooperation provisions do not regulate any 
substantive issues but regard merely the conduct and administration of multiple 
individual proceedings, which remain – as a matter of principle – independent from 
each other211. This is explicitly laid down in Article 72(3) of the Regulation, by not 
permitting the group coordination plan to recommend consolidation of the various 
estates, and thus, forbidding it to achieve substantive or procedural consolidation.  
 
In this way, the Regulation has adopted a model of ‘procedural coordination’ rejecting 
other alternative approaches, expressed in legal writing, and reflected in the 
Commission’s public consultation on the Future of the Insolvency Law212, as being the 
prevailing ones in the legal literature and in national laws. In particular, it rejects 
explicitly the ‘substantive consolidation’ involving the mixing of estate assets and 
liabilities, and the ‘procedural consolidation’ aligning the relevant insolvency 
proceedings, while it implies also the non-application of the strict ‘group COMI’ 
approach.  
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Substantive consolidation, more often discussed in the context of liquidation, entails 
the highest level of integration213 by allowing courts in specific circumstances214 to 
disregard the individual legal personality of each group member and consolidate their 
assets and liabilities to a single insolvency estate, from which all the creditors of the 
consolidated members obtain their payments215. This type of consolidation, although 
affirmed by the UK Supreme Court216, has been almost unanimously rejected217 as it 
overrides the ‘separability’ principle218. Indeed, the corporate independency with 
separate liabilities is a key aspect of an enterprise group, serving the different 
purposes and needs of the group members, and thus, its circumvention has several 
implications on many fields of law, especially on taxation and corporate law. 
Moreover, its adoption may lead to a massive reallocation of assets and, thus, 
undermine the general concept of liability, while affecting ex ante legitimate 
expectations of creditors219 of a specific legal entity which they have contracted 
with220. 
 
Procedural consolidation, on the other hand, adopted in the Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd 
case221, implies that only the procedural aspects of the insolvency proceedings are to 
be consolidated, respecting the substantive division between the estates. Thus it aims 
at bringing the group insolvencies together under the umbrella of one proceeding, at 
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the same place, administered by a single insolvency practitioner, without any 
consolidation of assets, making the repayments to the creditors on an estate-by-estate 
basis222. This type of consolidation, although safer and softer by definition, may face 
practical problems with regard to distinguishing between the estates as well as to the 
application of foreign substantive rules on each estate which could lead to legal 
discrepancies223. 
 
Another proposed tool of coordination is the use of jurisdictional requirements for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings, such as the ‘group COMI’ approach based on the 
idea that a subsidiary’s COMI should be located in the Member State of the parent 
company’s COMI in cases of a centralized management at the level of the parent 
company224. Accordingly, the insolvency proceedings against a parent company and 
such subsidiaries will be opened in the Member State of the parent company’s COMI, 
which facilitates coordination225. Although the EIR already allows for a certain degree 
of a group-COMI approach226, such an approach was early abandoned as being 
potentially detrimental to the rights of foreign creditors and too formalistic and 
restrictively applicable to specific types of group structures, especially those already 
obtaining a centralized management.  
 
In light of the above, it may seem sensible that the recast EIR preserves the identity of 
group members and the substantive rights of claimants following the entity-by-entity 
doctrine. Considering also the absence of an agreement among Member States, it does 
not surprise that the European legislators enter into the new area of group insolvency 
law by implementing the least interventionist approach227. Such a soft approach 
merely attempts to achieve consistency across the insolvency proceedings of all of the 
members of the group through coordination. At the same time, it protects the 
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Commission from exposure to the difficulties of the other alternative tools, taking into 
account that it constitutes the outcome of compromise between Parliament and the 
Commission228.  
 
It is doubtable, though, whether group insolvencies will achieve meaningful outcomes, 
since the provisions fail to adapt to the reality of economically integrated groups and 
interrelated business activities. 
At this point, and taking into account that substantial consolidation has been almost 
unanimously rejected229, and that the group-COMI approach is not suitable for all the 
situations, it seems that procedural consolidation would probably constitute the 
nearest feasible alternative to mere coordination. Indeed, it seems to be more 
effective to coordinate a multiplicity of proceedings by having the same individuals and 
court in charge of these proceedings, rather than providing for complicated and costly 
coordination mechanisms230, dividing the proceedings. The practical difficulty of the 
task is not a convincing argument able to justify the decision of the Commission to 
restrain itself from such an initiative231. Besides, the European Commission has 
acknowledged the virtues of procedural consolidation by allowing a kind of group-
COMI approach and the opening of the insolvency proceedings in a single 
jurisdiction232. 
 
Considering also that the results of the mere coordination mechanisms can be 
achieved by the cooperation and communication tools of Articles 56 – 60 EIR, a real 
reform and a step towards the harmonization of EU insolvency law to the benefit of 
the creditors while following the rescue-friendly orientation of the Regulation would 
be achieved by somehow centralizing the insolvency process. In this sense the single 
insolvency regime and forum would have the means of protecting creditors' interests 
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and considering the entire group as a whole rather than looking at each part 
separately233. 
 
 
2. Voluntary nature of the cooperation and coordination duties 
 
Although the obligation for cooperation and communication between the actors of the 
insolvency proceedings, namely the IPs and courts, is explicitly established, it is subject 
to several procedural limits and reservations234, reliant on the IPs’ and courts’ 
initiatives235. Given that neither legal remedy is provided cooperation results more or 
less voluntary. More specifically, the duty for cooperation only applies to the extent 
that such cooperation is appropriate to facilitate the effective administration of these 
proceedings, does not imply confidentiality issues, is compatible with the rules 
applicable to such proceedings (lex concursus)236 and does not entail any conflict of 
interests, thus, leaving room for recalcitrant jurisdictions to refuse cooperation237. 
 
It appears that even though the duty to cooperate and communicate is a valuable 
guideline and business-rescue mechanism, it can be disregarded rather easily, since the 
broad reservations included in the Regulation give the chance to both courts and IPs to 
do so. For example, an IP can argue that the cooperation does not facilitate the 
effective administration of the proceeding or that certain information is too sensitive to 
be communicated. The creditors on their side can easily bring up the reservation of 
conflict of interest blocking or delaying any type of cooperation effort, if they choose to 
do so. Hence, cooperation and communication appear more of a guideline rather than 
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an obligation. But still, the relevant provisions provide the IPs and courts with the 
means to act more efficiently; it is on their good will to use them in a beneficial manner. 
 
Coordination, on the other hand, is clearly set on a voluntary basis by virtue of the 
Recital 56 of the Regulation. The concept of the voluntary nature of group coordination 
proceedings is also manifested in the liberal opt-out and opt-in mechanisms238, the non-
binding nature of the group coordination plan239, as well as in the considerably low level 
of IPs’ actual powers240  
It is obvious that these indications provoke a certain degree of unpredictability and 
legal uncertainty, and limit dramatically the usefulness of the specific provisions, as it is 
doubtful to what extent they will be actually chosen by the actors involved. 
 
In particular the opt-out right, apart from causing a 30-day delay to the opening of the 
group coordination proceedings241, constitutes a very powerful weapon which may be 
used by individual IPs as “a strategic leverage in order to push through inappropriate 
demands or even induce parties willing to cooperate to pay a ‘vexation premium’ or 
bestow certain benefits to the disrupter as a consideration for not opting-out”242. 
Furthermore, the EIR fails to clarify to what extent a court can scrutinise the 
appropriateness of a restructuring plan243 and does not address actions for disputes 
arising from the coordination244. This uncertainty, along with the aforementioned 
points, could seriously hinder the restructuring of GoCs. 
 
Nevertheless, the Regulation shows an effort to counterweight and minimise the liberal 
and voluntary nature of the coordination proceedings in order to promote legal 
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certainty in insolvency proceedings of corporate groups. More specifically, the “comply-
or-explain” obligation set out in article 70(2) EIR and the revocation mechanism 
provided in article 75 EIR could act as deterrent to any abuse of powers; it must be 
noted though that these mechanisms constitute a mere formality and there is no 
specification providing what such justification should contain and to what extent it can 
be approved by the coordinator, the court and the competent bodies outlined in 
Articles 70 and 75. The danger of abuse of powers is somewhat counterbalanced also 
by the requirement to obtain the prior approval pursuant to national law245. Besides, 
the civil or even criminal liability that the IP usually faces in many jurisdictions along 
with the right of the court to revoke the appointment of the IP246 if their opt-out 
constituted a violation of their duties, aim also to prevent relevant abusive situations.  
 
Moreover, the opt-out right is subject to a strict time limit247, avoiding a constant threat 
that group members might opt out at any given moment248. Regarding the delay caused 
by the opt-out mechanism, it may be supported that, although difficult in practice, a 
faster opening could be obtained if the IPs involved agreed to waive their opt-out 
rights249. In addition, the opt-in mechanism, despite the complexity it adds, as long as in 
practice it will not delay the progress of the group coordination proceedings, can be 
welcomed as appropriate to enable effective group coordination proceedings, 
considering that it does not imply any danger of abuse comparable to the malpractices 
entailed in the opt-out mechanism.  
 
It must be further noted, that the opt-in and opt-out mechanisms could be proved to be 
useful for the corporate groups in case of problematic situations of IPs colluding with 
local creditors and not acting in the benefit of the companies. Besides, ‘forcing’ 
unwilling group members to be included into coordination proceedings might prove 
deterrent to business restructuring. 
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It still remains, though, an open question whether these ‘safety devices’250 will be 
sufficient to effectively prevent abuse and counterbalance their layers of cost and 
complexity or constitute just a “blunt sword”251 and do not efficiently fulfil their 
purpose.  
 
 
3. Forum shopping in the group insolvency 
 
One of the key objectives of the recast Regulation is to improve legal certainty and 
prevent malpractices of fraudulent or abusive forum shopping. The means foreseen in 
order to achieve such a remarkable goal in the insolvency proceedings of corporate 
groups entail clarifications and improvements in the procedural framework for 
determining jurisdiction of insolvency proceedings252, as wells as safeguards with 
regard to the performance of the cooperation and coordination duties. The efficiency 
of these means, however, is in question due to their inherent problematics. 
In particular, under the ‘modified universalism’ system adopted by the Regulation, the 
ability to forum shop depends a lot upon the vulnerability of COMI, thus on the way 
the latter is formulated. 
 
Ostensibly, the reforms on the method of determination of the business’s ‘centre of 
main interests’ would lead to a significant reduction of passive forum shopping, 
especially through the safeguards of the non-application time limits and the possibility 
to rebut the presumption of the registered office.  
However, when reasoning further, one should conclude that the Recast EIR has 
essentially accepted forum shopping in cases of corporate groups, as it allows the 
relocation of COMI towards more favourable jurisdictions253; albeit, in this way the 
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Regulation accepts only ‘good’ forum shopping, distinguishing from the ‘bad’ (abusive 
or fraudulent one) one254. 
Moreover, the omission of a group-COMI itself implicates difﬁculties with respect to 
the problem of forum shopping as it may be abused, while also the notion of the 
‘COMI’ itself may lead to misinterpretation and manipulation, especially due to the 
volatile and vague notion of ‘third parties’ ascertaining the company’s actual centre of 
management255.  
 
At the same time, the priority rule256 concerning the coordination of insolvency 
proceedings of corporate groups could constitute an incentive for ‘a race to the 
courts’, in order to obtain a more favourable position in the group proceedings by 
keeping the insolvency proceedings on ‘home turf’257. Besides, by permitting the party 
autonomy within European Insolvency Law and allowing ‘choice of court’ 
agreements258 - although hard to reach the provided majority - permits interlinked 
corporate entities to choose a different (central) forum259 and, using their synergy, to 
create more efficiency in cross-border insolvency proceedings260. Thus, the Recast EIR 
seems to have embraced forum shopping for the benefit of the collective261. It is quite 
possible that some of the appointed IPs under pressure from local creditors and 
stakeholders could tend to open proceedings at domestic courts, because that would – 
at least de facto – grant them prevalence over the group’s recovery strategy. Such an 
event could lead to an exacerbation of the problems connected to forum shopping.  
 
Albeit, the requirement of two thirds of the IPs to enable them to agree to change the 
competent court may act as a guarantee that the most appropriate court will be in 
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charge, “avoiding the hijacking of the proceedings by a minority"262. The Regulation, 
though, does not provide guidelines on how this selection of court is to be made, 
leaving room for legal discrepancies, subjective interpretation and hence, for 
malpractices263.  
 
It must be noted that the forum for the coordination has tremendous impact on the 
course of the proceedings. The group coordinator is appointed by the competent court 
and in accordance with the national law of that Member State. Furthermore, in 
absence of special provisions in the EIR, the group coordination procedure will be 
governed by the law of the court opening the proceedings; for instance, questions of 
opt-in and opt-out are subject to the jurisdiction of that speciﬁc Member State264. As 
the group coordinator will most likely be based in the Member State whose court 
opens the proceedings, the coordination will practically be dominated by the customs, 
the common practice and the insolvency law of that particular State265. Therefore, any 
abusive situations affect the proceedings to a great degree. 
With regard to the aforementioned problematics, it is not certain whether the 
Regulation is actually able to pursue its objective of combatting abusive forum 
shopping, as its own rules may lead to the opposite results. 
 
 
4. Effectiveness of the group coordination mechanism; Comparison 
with the general rules of cooperation 
 
The similarity of the coordination and cooperation provisions, to the extent that the 
latter involves a coordinated effort under the cooperation rules, is more than obvious, 
considering especially the possibility of a coordination plan outside the coordination 
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procedure, pursuant to Articles 56 (2) (c) and 60 (1) (b) (i)266. Hence, it seems somehow 
paradoxical that a coordinator would be needed in a situation where cooperation 
already runs smoothly. Besides, its effectiveness is doubtful when an earlier attempt at 
‘uncoordinated’ cooperation has already proven unsuccessful267. It is not yet certain 
which is the practical utility of inserting both group coordination procedure and the 
general provisions on cooperation, creating the reasonable question on what can the 
complicated coordination procedure achieve that cannot be reached by the general 
rules on cooperation268. 
 
Having regard to specific aspects of the coordination procedure, its importance and 
potential prevalence over the cooperation duty could prove to be reasonable. Factors 
like political inﬂuence, public expectations or a familiar forum may prove favourable 
and effective when a domestic court could become the group coordination court and 
take initiative269. It may also be argued that a coordinator might have the advantage of 
being an impartial and independent player in the negotiation, somehow supervising 
the procedures as well as the appointed insolvency practitioner. Besides, the more 
structured and organised coordination procedure might be more welcome and 
preferable than a general and volatile obligation to cooperate. 
 
Nevertheless, the necessity of group coordination is not certain, as in many cases the 
obligations to cooperate and communicate will sufﬁce, considering that they already 
foresee the possibility of having a coordinated restructuring plan in their framework. In 
addition, the voluntary nature of the coordination depending totally on the 
willingness, capacity and professionalism of the parties, along with the unnecessary 
bureaucracy and the overall cost270, may be deterrent, especially for smaller groups.  
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Additionally, the structure of the coordination proceedings is clearly administrative 
and quite formalistic entailing many requirements that render it complicated, lacking, 
though, the benefits of a real procedural consolidation.  
 
In view of the above, the concept of coordination is theoretically a beautiful idea, but 
the situations where such coordination can be used are more an exception than the 
rule.  
In practice, coordination proceedings would only make sense in isolated cases271; in 
particular, where, because of the volume, costs are a subordinate issue and can be 
undertaken, the different proceedings are interlinked so closely that an alternative 
resolution is less feasible, and all parties involved can agree upon one person suitable 
as coordinator, when especially this person is from outside. Thus, it is questionable 
whether such an elaborate procedure is really necessary for such a small area of 
application272. In the beginning and in the ﬁrst years of the EIR’s implementation, 
though, the procedure could be implemented, mainly for marketing reasons arising 
out of its innovative nature, and due to the IPs themselves, who might try to 
distinguish themselves as leading coordinators of group coordination proceedings and 
establish their reputation.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present analysis attempted to shed light on the practical feasibility and 
effectiveness of the new legal framework concerning the cross-border insolvency of 
groups of companies, as established by the Recast Regulation 2015/848 with the aim 
to facilitate the efficiency of the insolvency proceedings273. In order to address this 
central research question and come to a conclusion of whether the Regulation actually 
responded to the expectations, the research was conducted with a critic investigation 
of the main objectives of the EIR: the enhancement of legal certainty, combat of forum 
shopping and achievement of company rescue. 
 
The findings of the foregoing analysis show that the new provisions were conceived 
with the intention to promote the aforementioned objectives, but eventually they 
managed to achieve only partially such a purpose, failing to reach their full potential 
scope. 
Accordingly, the positive developments brought by the Regulation will be presented 
below, followed by the identified debatable issues which appear to remain open. 
 
First of all, the Regulation offers a concrete definition for the GoCs and inserts specific 
criteria for ascertaining their COMI and thus, the jurisdiction, with the objective to 
enhance legal certainty and reduce abusive relocations and forum shopping. 
Additionally, respecting the separate legal personality doctrine it does not explicitly 
adopt a group COMI, albeit it allows it in cases of centralised groups to achieve a group 
debt-restructuring in line with the ‘rescue-friendly’ culture. 
 
Moreover, it introduces the mechanisms of cooperation-communication and 
coordination in order to enhance the efficiency of the independent insolvency 
                                                 
273
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proceedings in a more centralised and coordinated manner, aiming to enhance legal 
certainty for the benefit of creditors and achieve a group restructuring.  
 
Nevertheless, albeit the new legal framework of corporate groups constitutes a step 
into the right direction, it is questionable whether it actually achieves the objectives of 
the Regulation, as inherent discrepancies appear evident.  
 
In particular, the scope of applicability of the new legal framework is limited to 
vertically integrated groups, thus ignoring other common corporate structures. The 
vulnerable concept of COMI containing volatile and subjective criteria might have the 
adverse results in the complicated situation of groups of companies where diverse 
COMIs exist. This may lead to manipulation and abusive forum shopping, thus affecting 
legal certainty and the predictability of the legal regime.   
 
In addition, the efficiency of the cooperation and coordination provisions is in 
question, considering the increasing cases of corporate groups having subsidiaries 
outside the EU274. Moreover, the mere ‘procedural coordination’ approach of these 
new provisions along with their formalistic and voluntary nature, render it difficult to 
assume that the new regulatory regime is workable in practice, considering also the 
complexity, costs and delays entailed. Especially the utility of the non-binding 
coordination mechanism is questionable taking into account that its results can be 
achieved with the cooperation mechanism and the restructuring plan envisaged 
therein. In light of these, effective group debt restructuring is rather uncertain. 
 
The efficiency of the new provisions though is not impossible. The mere existence of 
mechanisms aiming at the rescue of the group, namely the fact that such mechanisms 
are envisaged in law provisions and, thus, somehow ‘imposed’, may cultivate the 
                                                 
274
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willingness and motivation of the parties involved to work together effectively275. This 
will probably be sought in case of highly interconnected companies and promoted by 
IPs for marketing reasons. It remains to be seen how and to what extent they will be 
used by the actors involved upon whose discretion they ultimately rely. 
   
Besides, ambiguities arising from the quite volatile concept of COMI and the soft 
nature of the new mechanisms will probably become more concrete by future case 
law, and later on reviewed and improved by the EU legislators according to the new 
needs276. In this regard the fact that the Regulation already acknowledges the virtues 
of procedural consolidation by allowing a kind of group-COMI must be deemed 
positive for further review and development towards consolidation (even procedural). 
 
It appears anyhow that, given the difficulties related to group insolvencies, other 
alternative solutions would be hard to implement at a European level at this moment.   
Therefore, the Regulation seems to constitute a sensitive compromise between the 
conflicting interests of improving efficiency and achieving a group rescue, on the one 
hand, while respecting the independency of insolvency proceedings and the creditors’ 
rights, on the other hand. Indeed, the potentially positively effective remedies 
proposed by the Regulation faced the hard obstacle of the achievement of political 
consensus in the crucial matters, thus the EIR constitutes a political compromise. 
 
In conclusion, according to the results identified in the foregoing analysis, the flexible 
new regime introduced by the Recast Regulation, despite significant implementation 
issues, seems to have introduced useful tools for enhancing legal certainty, combating 
abusive forum shopping and achieving group rescue, thus shaping a new era for group 
insolvency. Nonetheless, it is hoped the Regulation will not represent the last step in 
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this direction, and future legislative initiatives are expected to achieve a more effective 
viability of insolvency proceedings. 
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